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REAL BUSINESS CYCLES: A NEW KEYNESIAN PERSPECTIVE
ABSTRACT
This paper is a critique of the latest new classical theory of
economic fluctuations. According to this theory, the business cycle
is the natural and efficient response of the economy to exogenous changes
in the available production technology. This paper discusses several
versions of this theory and argues that this line of research is unlikely
to yield an empirically plausible explanation of observed economic
fluctuations.
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technoldisturbances as the primary source of economic fluctuations and
its reliance on the intertemporal substitution of leisure to
explain changes in employment are fundamental weaknesses.
Moreover, to the extent that it trivializes the social cost of
observed fluctuations, real business cycle theory is potentially
dangerous. The danger is that those who advise policy-makers
might attempt to use it to evaluate the effects of alternative
macroeconomic policies or to conclude that macroeconomic policies
are unnecessary.
Wairasian Equilibrium and The Classical Dichotomy
The typical undergraduate course in microeconomics begins
with partial equilibrium analysis of individual markets. A
market for a good is characterized by a downward sloping demand
curve and an upward sloping supply curve. The price of the good
is assumed to adjust until the quantity supplied equals the
quantity demanded.
The course then builds up to Wairasian general equilibrium.
In this Wairasian equilibrium, prices adjust to equate supply and
demand in every market simultaneously. The general equilibrium
system determines the quantities of all goods and services sold
and their relative prices. The most important theoretical
result, after the existence of such a Wairasian equilibrium, is
the "invisible hand" theorem: the equilibrium is Pareto
efficient.
Courses in microeconomics thus show how employment.
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Keynesian macroeconomics destroys the classical dichotomy by
abandoning the assumption that wages and prices adjust instantly
to clear markets. This approach is motivated by the observation
3chat many nominal wages are fixed by long-term labor contracts
and many product prices remain unchangedfor longperiods of
time. Once the inflexibility ofwages andprices isadmitted
into a macroeconomic model, theclassicaldichotomyand the





Much work in the new classical revolution of
the l970s destroy the classical dichotomy without
abandoning tal axiom of continuous market clearing.
(Lucas 1972,1973) These models were based on the assumption that
individuals have imperfect information regarding prices. These
individuals therefore confuse movements in the overall price
level (which under the classical dichotomy should not matter)
with movements in relative prices (which should matter). An
unanticipated decrease in the money supply leads individuals to
infer that the relative prices of the goods they produce are
temporarily low, which induces them to reduce the quantity
supplied. TJhile the fascination with this sort of story was
substantial in the l970s, it has attracted relatively few
adherents in the 1980s. It is hard to believe that confusion
about the price level is sufficiently great to generate the large
changes in quantities observed over the business cycle.
In contrast to both the Keynesian and the early new
classical approaches to the business cycle, real business cycle
theory embraces the classical dichotomy. It accepts the complete
irrelevance of monetary policy,
by almost all macroeconomists a
thereby denying a tenet accepted
decade ago. Nominal variables,
4such as the money supply and the price level, are assumed to have
no role in explaining fluctuations in real variables, such as
output and employment.
Real business cycle theory thus pushes the Walrasian model
farther than it has been pushed before. In evaluating whether it
providesa successful explanation of recessions and booms, two
questions naturally arise. First, why are there such large
fluctuations in output and employment? And second, why do
movements in nominal variables, such as the money supply, appear
related to movements in real variables, such as output?
Classical and Keynesian Views of Economic Fluctuations
The only forces that can cause economic fluctuations,
according to real business cycle theory, are those forces that
change the Wairasian equilibrium. The Walrasian equilibrium is
simply the set of quantities and relative prices that
simultaneously equate supply and demand in all markets in the
economy. To understand how real business cycle theory explains
the business cycle, it is necessary to look into the fundamental
forces that change the supplies and demands for various goods and
services
Many sorts of macroeconomic disturbances can in principle
generate fluctuations in real business cycle models. For
example, changes in the level of government purchases or in the
investment tax credit alter the demand for goods and therefore
affect the WaIrasian equilibrium. Changes in the relative price
5of oilalterthe equilibrium allocation of labor among
alternative uses. Many of the macroeconomic disturbances that
receive much attention among Keynesian macroeconomists will also
have important effects in real business cycle models. There is,
however, substantial disagreement between the two schools
regarding the mechanisms through which these disturbances work.
Consider the case of a temporary increase in government
purchases. Almost all macroeconomists agree that such a change
causes an increase in output and employment, and the evidence,
mainly from wartime experience, supports this prediction. Yet
the explanations of this effect of government purchases differ
greatly. (Cf. Barro 1987 and Dornbusch and Fischer 1987)
Real business cycle theory emphasizes the intertemporal
substitution of goods and leisure.It begins by pointing out
that an increase in government purchases increases the demand for
goods. To achieve equilibrium in the goods market, the real
interest rate must rise, which reduces consumption and
investment. The increase in the real interest rate also causes
individuals to reallocate leisure across time. In particular, at
a higher real interest rate, working today becomes relatively
more attractive than working in the future; today's labor supply
therefore increases. This increase in labor supply causes
equilibrium employment and output to rise.
While Keynesian theory also predicts an increase in the real
interest rate in response to a temporary increase in government
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2A related explanation of the procyclical behavior of the
Solow residual has recently been proposed by Hall (1987): Hall
points Out that if price exceeds marginal cost because of
imperfect competition, then the measured Solow residual will
appear procyclical even if the true production technology is
unchanging. Alternatively, the Solow residual could reflect
endogenous changes in technology due to demand shocks: such
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adverse technological shock,we would be aware of it. My own reading of the newspaper,
Whether changes in energy prices affect the Solow residual
computed from GNP depends on a variety of issues involving the
construction of index numbers like CNP.See Bruno and Sachs
(1985, P. 43) for a discussion.
4Hamilton (1983) finds oil price changes are also associated
with the pre-OPEC recessions. Yet these prices changes are much
too small to explain plausibly such large declines in
productivity.
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15all goods. An observer would see an aggregate business cycle,
even without a single aggregate shock.
To get these real business cycle models to work, however,
the number of independent sectoral shocks cannot be too great.
If there were many independent sectoral shocks and labor were
mobile between sectors, then the law of large numbers would
guarantee that these shocks and their effect on the aggregate
economy would average out to zero. To get an aggregate business
cycle, these models therefore require that there be only a few
sectors and that these sectors be subject to large technological
disturbances. These models are therefore similar to the single-
sector theories and suffer from the same weaknesses: the absence
of any direct evidence for such large technological disturbances
and the implausibility of strong intertemporal substitutability
of leisure.
A second type of sectoral shock theory emphasizes the costly
adjustment of labor among sectors. (Lilien 1982) These models,
which depart more from the Walrasian paradigm, assume that when a
worker moves from one sector to another, a period of unemployment
is required, perhaps for job search. In this case, independent
shocks across many sectors do not offset each other. Recessions
are, according to these theories, periods of more sectoral shocks
and thus greater intersectoral. adjustment.
This type of real business cycle theory may appear more
plausible than those relying on substantial aggregate
productivity shocks and intertemporal substitution. It is
16Money and Prices over the Business Cycle
Before real business cycle theory
debate in the early 1980s, almost all
agree on one conclusion: money matters.
discussions of business cycles (Friedman
more formal econometric work (Barro 1977)
Reserve as an important source of macroeconomic disturbances.
While there was controversy as to whether systematic monetary
policy could stabilize the economy, it was universally accepted
that bad monetary policy could be destabilizing.
17
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pointed to the Fe
and
deralit is ironic that real business cycle theory arose in the
wake of Paul Voicker's disinflation. Many economists view this
recent experience as clear confirmation of -the potency of
monetary policy. Voicker announced he was going to slow the rate
of money growth to achieve a lower rate of inflation; the rate of
money growth in fact slowed down; and one of the deepest post-war
recessions followed, as did an eventual reduction in the rate of
inflation. This set of events is easy to explain within the
context of Keynesian theory with its emphasis on the gradual
adjustment of wages and prices.It is less easy to explain
within the context of real business cycle theory.5
Robert King and Charles Plosset (1984) explain the
historical association between money and output by arguing that
the money supply endogenously responds to fluctuations in output.
Standard measures of the money supply such as Ml are mostly
inside money, that is, money created by the banking system. King
and Plosser suggest that the transactions services of inside
money should be viewed as simply the "output" of one sector of
the economy, the banking sector. Just as one should expect the
outputs of different sectors to move together within a multi-
sector real business cycle model, one should expect the output of
the banking sector to move with the outputs of other sectors. An
increase in productivity in any sector will tend to increase the
The recent disinflation is not unusual. Romer and Romer
(1989) show that output typically falls after the Fed makes an
explicit decision to reduce inflation, which they interpret as
evidence against real business cycle theory.
18While the story of K
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6Indeed, as King and Plosser point out, their model makes
the counterfactual prediction that the price level should be
countercyclical: since the demand for real outside money probably
rises in a boom, and it is the outside money stock that pins down
the price level, equilibrium in the market for outside money
requires that the price level fall in a boom.
19
demand fortransactions services; the banking system respondsby
creatingmore inside money. Hence, the procyclical behaviorof
standardmonetary aggregates cannot necessarily be interpretedas
evidencethat changes in outside money caused by the monetary
authorityhave real effects.


























has thusThe Tradeoff between Internal, and External Consistency
A good theory has two characteristics: internal consistency
and external consistency. An internally consistent theory is one
that is parsimonious; it invokes no ad hoc or peculiar axioms.
An externally consistent theory is one that fits the facts; it
makes empirically refutable predictions that are not refuted.
All scientists, including economists, strive for theories that
are both internally and externally consistent. Yet like all
optimizing agents, scientists face tradeoffs. One theory may be
more "beautiful," while another may be easier to reconcile with
observation.
The choice between alternative theories of the business
cycle--in particular, between real business cycle theory and new
Keynesian theory- -ispartly a choice between internal and
external consistency. Real business cycle theory extends the
Wairasian paradigm, the most widely understood and taught model
in economics, and provides a unified explanation for economic
growth and economic fluctuations. New Keynesian theory, in its
attempt to mimic the world more accurately, relies on nominal
rigidities that are observed but only little understood. Indeed,
new Keynesians sometimes suggest that to understand the business
cycle, it may be necessary to reject the axiom of rational,
optimizing individuals, an act which for economists would be the
ultimate abandonment of internal consistency.
The tension between these two goals of science will
undoubtedly continue. Each school of macroeconomic thought will
20highlight its strengths while trying to improve on its
weaknesses. My own forecast is that real business cycle
advocates will not manage to produce convincing evidence that
there are substantial shocks to technology and that leisure is
highly substitutable over time. Without such evidence, their
theories will be judged as not persuasive. New Keynesians,
however, have made substantial progress in recent years toward
providing rigorous microeconomic foundations, the absence of
which was the fatal flaw of the Keynesian consensus of the l960s.
Jhile real business cycle theory has served the important
function of stimulating and provoking the scientific debate, it
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